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Abstract
Android Notifications can be considered as essential parts in Human-
Smartphone interaction and inextricable modules of modern mobile appli-
cations that can facilitate User Interaction and improve User Experience.
This paper presents how this well-crafted and thoroughly documented
mechanism, provided by the OS can be exploited by an adversary. More
precisely, we present attacks that result either in forging smartphone ap-
plication notifications to lure the user in disclosing sensitive information,
or manipulate Android Notifications to launch a Denial of Service attack
to the users’ device, locally and remotely, rendering them unusable. This
paper concludes by proposing generic countermeasures for the discussed
security threats.
Keywords: Android, Notifications, Phishing, Local DoS
1 Introduction
Modern mobile devices have penetrated our daily lives in the past years,
making them an indispensable part of our daily lives. Initially, their goal
was to provide communication to users via various means e.g. calls, short
messages, video conference and chatting. Nevertheless, currently, they
have stormed other activities such as infotainment, Internet browsing,
fitness monitoring, or even finance. The fact that these devices are small
enough to be seamlessly carried on daily basis and the fact that they
are able to perform multiple tasks and process data from a plethora of
embedded sensors has enabled developers to create numerous applications
and a new niche market.
The interaction between users and mobile devices increases over the
years and as a result the means of realizing this bi-directional communi-
cation has also evolved. Back in 2014 a comprehensive study on mobile
phone notifications [19] revealed that users had to deal with 63.5 notifica-
tions on average per day, mostly from messengers and email. Obviously,
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this number has been increased significantly over the last years with the
rise of apps such as WhatsApp and Facebook messenger and notification
messages overpassing billions in daily basis [30].
At the same time recent studies reveal that push notifications draw
users’ attention, with user average opening notification rates being over
90% [6]. Notifications also allow developers to increase user engagement
with their app and improve user retention rates [6]. Mobile notifications
seem to clearly influence user engagement positively and also improve user
conversion rates. As stated in [7]:
“In 2015, users who enabled push notifications launched an app
an average of 14.7 times per month, whereas users who did not
only launched an app 5.4 times per month. In other words,
users who opted in to push messages averaged 3x more app
launches than those who opted out.”
Equivalent findings are also reported in [22]:
“Analysis of 63 million app users’ first 90-days reveals more
frequent messaging increases mobile app retention rates by 3X
to 10X”.
In view of the above this paper illustrates the necessity of providing
mobile users with secured and trusted mechanisms for their interaction
with mobile devices. Towards this end, this paper analyzes the basic
interaction mechanisms available in Android, the worlds’ most popular
mobile platform to date. Our research illustrates flaws in the Android’s
notification mechanisms which can lead to a number of attacks, presented
in this work. Subsequently, this paper also discusses about countermea-
sures in order to provide defense solutions to the attacks.
Main contributions: The main contribution of this work is to illustrate
successful attacks in the most recent versions of Android, using AOSP as
a reference. These attacks can affect additively the majority of Android
users to date. More specifically, this paper presents forging notification
attacks that include home-screen shortcuts, attacks in notifications that
result in DOS and also attacks concerning web push notifications. To
the best of our knowledge, and according to the malware samples of [24],
notifications are used for aggressive advertisement via the malware fam-
ilies of Airpush and Kuguo. Overall, we aim in providing a thorough
analysis in the core means of realizing Human-Smartphone interaction,
both for providing a way to detect flaws and also for better locating their
corresponding working solutions.
Organization of this work: The rest of this work is organized as fol-
lows. In the next section we present the related work. Section 3 provides
the background and the basis for the problem setting. Then, Section 4
presents two distinct categories of attacks on Android Notifications. Fi-
nally, the article concludes discussing possible countermeasures.
2 Related work
Android was designed to run in devices with constrained capabilities in
terms of both computation or size. The size of the device, as Android
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mainly targets handheld devices, implies many restrictions in the UI. As
a result, the UI can be considered as a set of layers which are stacked
one on top of the other. However, as highlighted in [9]: “Phishing attacks
can be mounted convincingly because the Android UI does not identify the
currently running application.”. This was exploited by [18] who managed
to create the first UI redressing attack for Android. While drawing on top
of other activities and partially covering them, researchers have recently
started to find novel ways to do it. The bulk of the attacks exploit a re-
cently introduced Android permission, the System Alert Window [28, 13].
According to Google Developer resources [4]: “Very few apps should use
this permission; these windows are intended for system-level interaction
with the user”. Nevertheless, due to backward compatibility issues, an
adversary may easily use this permission without the user’s knowledge or
consent by targeting lower API levels in the app. While the attacks have
rather severe impact, the apps that can exploit this feature are rather
limited and can be easily found by simply scanning the manifest for the
corresponding permissions. On the contrary, a more stealth attack allows
an adversary to overlay activities without requesting any permission from
the user [2].
However, in order to timely present the user a screen which requires
him to provide his credentials, one needs to be aware of which is the
foreground activity. Methods to do this are discussed in [8, 2], however,
they are rendered useless as of Nougat, since access to /proc has been
significantly shrinked. To counter this lack of knowledge, an adversary
may resort to other means, e.g. masquerade as a legitimate app and
convince the user to interact. Note that all apps are aware of which
apps are already installed in the device, so the adversary can easily find
a target one. In this regard, in [27]; a closely related work to us, a set
of attacks which exploit notifications was proposed. The concept is that
the user has been tricked into installing a malicious app named Notish
which issues notifications that look like ones from other legitimate apps
luring them to disclose sensitive information e.g. credentials. The attacks
that the authors demonstrate apply not only to Android, but iOS and
Blackberry, while a spam scenario also exists.
Perhaps the most relevant to ours can be considered the work of [27],
for this reason it is further analyzed. Back in 2012 the authors where
supporting that they first presented a paper regarding the security of
notifications in mobile phones. Specifically regarding Android, they cov-
ered platforms 2.3 and 4.0 (API level 14). Nevertheless, many years have
passed and considering the small mobile OS lifetime, this period was quite
significant for many reasons. Most importantly, Android has changed a lot
since 2012, providing 12 newer API levels to date, with the introduction
of Android Oreo, always hardening its security. To this end, notification
services can be considered as much different compared with the situation
in 2012. More specifically, not only are their security mechanisms more
improved, but also the attacks described in [27] do not actually apply in
the settings of Android in its latest versions. The most basic reason is
that these attacks depended on hard-coded resource graphics, which, after
being submitted for publication to Google Play Store, they would immedi-
ately be discarded by the Google Bouncer as it would find them fraudulent.
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Moreover, most of the notifications’ functionalities that are exploited in
this paper, such as replacing the notifications’ icon, where introduced very
recently. e.g. the “Notification.Builder setSmallIcon (Icon icon)” function
was added in API level 23. Furthermore, in the last versions of Android,
the app name has been supplementarily added in notifications, enhancing
their security even more, once again rendering past attacks useless.
The interested reader may refer to [10, 23] for more on phishing attacks
on Android.
3 Human-Smartphone Interaction
Analyzing the interaction between humans and smartphones, we may
come up in itemizing the most profound and basic reasons for humans
using this “special” computing device, namely the smartphone, that has
drown much of the users’ interest over the last decade. The categoriza-
tion of these actions could inarguably differ, facilitating other points of
view, however, for the purposes of this study we split them in the follow-
ing four categories: (a) Communicating with others (calling, texting etc.)
(b) Internet browsing, (c) Using 3rd party applications (m-banking, info-
tainment etc.), (d) Responding to notifications To conclude to these four
basic categories of actions in using a mobile device, we investigated why,
how, when and under what conditions an average user might be using
a smartphone. While there might be overlaps in these categories, dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs, we consider these reasons of realizing
human-smartphone interaction as distinct.
Communicating with others via calling, texting etc. are basic and
fundamental actions performed in mobile devices even before the existence
of smartphones, namely since the appearance of feature phones. This kind
of interaction is accomplished through applications that accompany the
OS and are developed by the OS vendor. Certainly, both phone calling and
text messaging can be also realized by third party applications, while VoIP
solutions are also rapidly appearing. Nevertheless, this can be considered
as a fundamental reason for using a mobile device, since its very existence
and before having these devices being able to connect to the Internet.
Using the well-known mobile browsers for visiting and interacting with
web pages through mobile devices is also considered as a very important
reason of human-smartphone interaction. Notably, in 2016 mobile phone
users who visit the WWW overpassed the corresponding number of per-
sonal computer users [21]. The latter not only highlights the importance of
such an interaction, but it also indicates the closer connection to humans’
lives that smartphones have managed to acquire.
Using third party applications in a smartphone can be considered as
one of the most important and basic reasons of interaction between users
and mobiles. The incorporation of all kinds of applications that are of the
users’ interests has been perhaps the basic reason for smartphones hav-
ing operating systems that support this kind of functionality and thus
make them considerably distinguishable to “ordinary” feature phones.
The extraordinary adoption of app stores where users can browse and
install applications of numerous categories supports the aforementioned
4
argument. Additionally, recent studies [12] between smartphones provide
strong indications that mobile applications are the users’ preferred way
of interaction when using their smartphone for some reason (e.g. play
a game, buy tickets, check a personal bank account balance), compared
with the corresponding services relying in web pages. The usage of third
party applications of course implies the existence of notifications in a high
percentage of use cases, such as receiving and consequently responding to
instant messages. This part of interaction, however, is covered separately
in the following paragraphs.
Finally, as already mentioned, we consider that responding to notifica-
tions is a special interaction between humans and smartphones. By using
the term “responding”, we consider both the cases when users actually
respond to received notifications by “opening” them, as well as the cases
of even more basic actions, such as using the smartphones’ built-in noti-
fication drawer to see and/or read the messages of the notifications, even
if the users, in some cases, decide not to “open” a notification and just
“clear” it after reading part of its message. This kind of interaction can be
considered of great importance as it forms a very common reason of using
the smartphone in modern human-smartphone interaction and because it
is expected to grow even more and become more important in the years
to come. A smartphone can receive notifications for a large number of
reasons that include, yet are not limited to, the following:
• Having missed a phone call
• A newly received text message
• System automatically updated applications
• System automatically updated applications
• Results from periodically scheduled jobs such as software update
checking and virus scanning
• Messages from carriers
• Push notifications coming from external resources, corresponding to
installed applications. Perhaps the most notable ones in this cate-
gory are instant messaging applications such as WhatsApp, Viber
and Facebook messenger
• Web push notifications that constitute a quite “recent” addition in
most mobile browsers’ capabilities, where even not used web pages
are able to transmit their notifications to targeted mobile devices
• Local app notifications, where third party apps create and issue a
notification in order to be read by the user, or require an action
taken by the user
The aforementioned categories of notifications are significant and ba-
sic, however one should investigate the underlying reasons why this “kind”
of interaction is important more thoroughly. Thus the reader may have
both a rational explanation and also the evidence deriving from the users’
experience about the authors’ claims. Notifying in terms of mobile com-
puting means, at its fundamental definition, implies finding a way to reach
the user, gain his/her attention. This can be variously achieved, aligned
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with the Operating System’s supported corresponding functionalities. A
foreground application being used by a smartphone user can change/up-
date its Graphical User Interface (GUI) to provide new information to
the user. The same use-case may occur in a web environment, where a
web page may dynamically adjust its content. When considering appli-
cations that are not currently active, or are running in the background,
or are even closed since the mobile device is switched off, the ways to
accomplish user notification changes significantly, since additional param-
eters have to be taken into account. Notably, new information that would
change the contents of an Android activity but would not be launched
until a user actually opened the corresponding application cannot be con-
sidered as a timely, nor an acceptable way to realize user attention. On
the contrary, modern mobile notifications try to “force” user interaction
and do not rely on waiting when or whether the user decides to check
their corresponding app.
In this sense, native mobile applications may choose among a variety of
programmatically feasible solutions in order to draw users’ attention, such
as newly launched activities, opened web pages through browsers, dialog
messages, toast messages and of course native Android notifications. The
latter, however, has some considerable advantages to count, as it will
be further explained, thus may be chosen as the prevailing solution in a
majority of use cases where an application is not being used, or when a
device is switched off.
Essentially, all the aforementioned “solutions” can work towards the
direction of informing the user about something. Nevertheless, as it will
be further discussed, in the cases where users are either not using their
mobile device, or a specific app, developers may opt in favor of the native
Android notifications to accomplish user-app interaction. Toast messages
involve two basic drawbacks in these cases. First, they are useless when a
mobile device is switched off or locked, since they will not appear. In the
case where the mobile device is unlocked and awaken, a displayed toast
message can only provide short information to a user, for only 5 seconds
without necessarily providing the identity of the issuer. Newly launched
activities, or launched mobile pages through mobile browsers are defi-
nitely more “permanent” than toast messages solutions, since they do not
disappear after a specific period of time, nor get affected by the state of
the mobile device, namely when they are closed and/or locked. However,
both are invasive in terms of user-mobile interaction since they impose
their presence as the foreground app in the mobile device’s main User In-
terface (UI). Moreover, there is no guarantee that they are going to be the
foreground app when the user unlocks the phone, since other, newer, activ-
ities might have been launched, putting them in the background. Android
dialog messages suffer the same disadvantages too. Additionally, dialog
messages are required to hold the quite “dangerous” system permission
that allows them to draw over other screens to accomplish the desirable
result, namely the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission, that can be
maliciously used [13].
Deductively, we lead to reason why the Android notifications are the
preferred, and the suggested by Google, way of realizing the communica-
tion between a user and an unused app, or even more precisely, between
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a user and an application that is not in the foreground. In addition, the
internal design of Android notifications provides them with some valu-
able assets in terms of establishing an effective and accepted solution for
asynchronous or semi-synchronous background initiated communication
between users and apps. These assets include great levels of effective-
ness in terms of OSes resources usage, permanence and user friendliness
in terms of providing a noninvasive way of notifying users. Nevertheless,
there are two points that require significant attention. All kinds of notifi-
cations that are issued from a “background” process when either a device
is locked or when a user is using an irrelevant application also means that
the identity of the notification issuer is also very critical. When a user is
actually using an application and the application’s content changes, users
can feel quite sure, presumably, that the changed content originates from
the application they use. On the contrary, when users receive incoming
information from an application they are not actively using, they ratio-
nally need to be able to verify its actual source. This is the reason why,
when receiving an email from an unknown source requesting the bank
credentials to proceed to an action issued by a well-known bank, most
users, hopefully, consider this email as fake and subsequently delete it.
Accordingly, a mobile phone user is expecting to be able to confirm a no-
tifications’ issuer true identity before proceeding to an action that could
range from posting an unwanted message to a social network, to expos-
ing the user’s login credentials for his/her bank account, or a company’s
server login. To this end, the notifications’ nature can be considered as
even more deceptive when they are asynchronous to the users’ active in-
teraction, since by definition are not expected to appear when users are
using the issuing applications and respectively know their origin.
As already mentioned, the aim of this paper is twofold. One the one
hand, provides evidence, regrettably, that Android notifications can be
provably be insecure in contrast to their wide adoption and increased in-
terest by both developers and users. On the other hand, the authors also
suggest solutions that may address the arising security issues. Towards
this direction, even though applying the countermeasures will not provide
ground proof that Android notifications will subsequently become secure,
closing security holes still improves them and also helps towards the direc-
tion of maturing an ever developing and constantly evolving mobile oper-
ating system. For these reasons, the analyzed underlying security issues
and not only statically illustrated, rather than the causes of their origin
are investigated and generic solutions as countermeasures are proposed.
Leaving the programming level and anatomizing the more abstract level of
the Android Notifications’ infrastructure in terms of Human-Smartphone
interaction not only reveals this “mechanism’s” profound architecture, but
also projects both its strengths and weaknesses.
4 Attacks on Android Notifications
In this section we discuss attacks on Android Notifications. More specifi-
cally, our main focus will be to illustrate the feasibility of forging applica-
tion notifications, which expose the users’ privacy and security. Secondly,
7
we present how Android’s notifications can be exploited to launch a Denial
of Service (DoS) attack, both locally and remotely.
4.1 Forging app notifications
As already analyzed in the previous section, the interaction between smart-
phone apps and users is bidirectional. In the case of users’ initiated in-
teraction, namely user-to-app, users are having knowledge about the ap-
plications that they launch and use. In this paper we are going to prove
that by designing a fine-tuned, yet based of evidence, attack to Android
users, the app-to-user interaction can be exploited. In particular, the at-
tack that is illustrated in this section involves a number of steps from the
attacker’s side, involving fundamental Android components and services.
The impact of forging notifications can be considered rather high, as it can
be used to deceive them to collect user credentials, perform user profiling,
or even blackmailing. The steps of the attack are illustrated in Figure 2.
Following, a use case is also presented and analyzed. For the purposes of
highlighting the dangers that accompany this attack, in our step-by-step
use case scenario we have chosen “PayPal” as the “target” app. The steps
are the following:
• A user installs a zero-permission app through Google Play. The
apps name is BobApp and requires only Internet access (even this
permission can by bypassed if necessary).
• The installed app retrieves the list of installed applications in the
victim’s device. The list is communicated to a service owned by the
attacker.
• The attacker determines whether an app that he would like to make
an attack to is available in victims’ devices. In this scenario it is
“PayPal”.
• The attacker issues an update for the app, through Google Play,
where the app’s name is replaced, namely “BobApp” becomes “Pay-
Pal”. The update is expected to be launched automatically, usually
by night, when the device is unattended (e.g. probably left charging
and connected to a Wifi).
• After a successful application update, the malicious app’s name has
been changed, while the user (owner) has no way to know about it.
• To build a complete notification, the malicious app requires a title, a
text and also the target app’s icon. This is accomplished by utilizing
the actual genuine target app’s resources. More specifically, the
target app’s package is located and the app’s graphics are retrieved
through the application’s resources and the application’s metadata.
As a result, a new notification is triggered, with an identical to the
genuine app interface.
• After triggering the malicious notification, the user is expected to
select it and subsequently launch a malicious activity. The malicious
activity can further utilize the genuine app’s resources in order to
provide a UI that will lure the user.
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Figure 1: A forged notification from another app.
• Finally, the user is asked for some private info (credentials) compro-
mising her/his account.
The above scenario has been tested both locally and through Google
Play. A forged notification for PayPal on Nougat is illustrated in Figure
1. More interestingly, since the ID for an app located in Google Play con-
sists only of its package name, one can very easily find numerous apps in
Google Play sharing the same name. Moreover, after thorough research
we have come up with the conclusion that bypassing a notification’s actual
app name is almost impossible by other means in AOSP. Achieving this
programmatically requires the “substitute notification app name’´’ signa-
ture permission, which only 2-3 system apps actively have. Indeed, our
research revealed that these apps are “Easter Eggs”, “Google Play” and
“Shell”. The combination of using other apps’ resources and changing
the app name arbitrarily through background silent updates, makes the
described attack scenario both effective and real. Indeed, the described
attack proves to the readers that Android users can be led to a situa-
tion where they would not be able to reason about the origin of their
smartphones’ notifications.
Finally, another part of the Android’s user interaction mechanism that
has been found to have flaws is the home-screen application shortcuts.
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Figure 2: Attack overview.
Home-screen shortcuts are coupled to notifications in many cases since
once one or more notifications have been issued by an application, an
indicative change appears in the corresponding app’s shortcut (e.g. an in-
dicating number of unread notifications). Nonetheless, home-screen short-
cuts are also being frequently used by users to initiate an interaction with
an app. Our independent research has revealed that Android home-screen
app shortcuts can be easily forged and a malicious application can appear
on a device’s home-screen as another application, with identical icon and
name. Both the home-screen icon and also the name of the shortcut are
not hard-coded and do not originate from the app’s resources. As a re-
sult every application is able to create a home-screen shortcut as being
another app. In this sense, forged app notifications can “cooperate” with
forged app home-screen shortcuts to further deceive the user. Even with-
out having notifications issued, home-screen shortcuts provide attackers
with another attack-vector in the human-smartphone interaction.
Both security issues, regarding forged notifications and forged home-
screen shortcuts, have been responsibly disclosed to Google’s Android
Security Team.
4.2 DoS through Notifications
Following another approach, notifications can be used to launch a de-
nial of service both locally and remotely. The attack exploits a bug in
NotificationManager when allocating memory for creating a Notification.
The notification’s builder object expects a specific size of the icon, yet
allocates memory for any given image graphic. Potentially, this bug may
allow arbitrary code execution, however, to this point, we were not able
to execute it. As a result, the attack; currently being patched by Android
Security Team, is launched when a properly crafted notification is sent
to the NotificationManger class. After launching the attack, the System
UI process repeatedly crashes blocking the user from making any other
interaction apart from answering a call and rebooting. Notably, while
answering calls is allowed, the UI does not revert to the original state.
Furthermore, by registering a broadcast receiver Android object waiting
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for the “BOOT COMPLETED” event and re-issuing the malicious noti-
fication makes the device unusable, since the device will immediately fall
to the previous looping state. Possible countermeasures, before a patch
is applied by Google, is to uninstall the malicious application through a
possible “safe mode” device state, or re-flashing the whole device.
To launch this attack, actually almost no code is required, since only a
“big” image of high resolution is needed to be sent to NotificationManager
for rendering. In our tests we used a high resolution (4096x4096) PNG file,
of rather low file size (2.79 KB), however larger graphics have the same
effect. Such a “malicious” image can either be stored in the application’s
resources, or be loaded dynamically. Nevertheless, some critical issues
arise by its actual capability to be able to be loaded dynamically, from
other resources than the actual application that is firing the notification.
Clearly, the above scenario is triggered locally, by a malicious installed
app. Nonetheless, this can also be triggered remotely. As of API level 23,
the Notification.Builder class includes a new method, namely “Notifica-
tion.Builder setSmallIcon (Icon icon)”, which accepts an icon rather that
a resource. This way, many apps (e.g. Youtube), use Internet resources to
download their graphics. Since this information is not private and servers
want to take advantage of caching, such graphics are mostly transmitted
via plain HTTP. Using a simple man-in-the-middle attack, an adversary
can replace the requested graphic with a high resolution graphic and brick
the devices remotely.
Even when examining the case where a device is targeted in API levels
less than 23, where the new “setSmallIcon” function was not available and
even if there was the possibility of pre-checking the resources of each app
that could be used as icons, the problem still exists. Namely, since apps’
resources are “public” to other installed apps, a malicious application
could very easily scan the device for all installed apps’ resources and select
a high resolution image and use it for the attack.
4.3 Web push Notifications
Recently, the ability to fire notifications has been also given to web pages,
with a big number of modern and popular mobile browsers supporting this
feature. In our tests we have successfully tested web push notifications
on Android devices running Chrome version ≥ 42, Mozilla version ≥ 44
and Samsung Internet browser version ≥ 4.0. Having the ability to notify
a user asynchronously was one of the very basic advantages that native
mobile applications had in the past, in contrast to web pages, whose
lifetime of interaction with the user was bounded to the time the user
spent in browsing on a specific web page.
Web push notifications were introduced to fill this gap. This func-
tionality is established through a “bridge” between the native app world
and the web pages ecosystem, provided by the mobile browser. A mo-
bile browser is a “special” kind of software entity. Since it operates in
both of these “worlds”, it is actually a native mobile application installed
in a smartphone, while simultaneously its basic purpose is to serve web
pages. As a result, having some special permissions given by the user
explicitly, a web page is able to send a push notification asynchronously
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to the browser and consequently, the browser is responsible for “commu-
nicating” this notification to the user’s device, utilizing the OSes native
mechanisms.
However, the latter introduces another attack vector for phishing at-
tacks. Assume the case of a user accepting notifications from a malicious
web page from his mobile browser. The web page then can push an ar-
bitrary notification to the device at any given point. Practically, in our
phishing scenario, the malicious web page pushes a notification with the
icon of an app with millions of downloads, expecting users to respond.
The notification redirects the user to a webpage which replicates the UI
of the targeted app requesting for sensitive information, e.g. credentials.
While the notification may verbally state that the notification originates
from the browser, yet the visual identity, the displayed icon and the no-
tification text, may lure many users. Under the precondition that a web
page is able to determine which applications a user has installed in her/his
device, recently published in [1], a forging app notification use case could
be able to appear in web push notifications too. Both text and graph-
ics can be easily arbitrarily be loaded through web resources. However,
the actual notifications “issuer” in these cases is always the name of the
browser (e.g. Chrome), accompanied by the notification’s title. In this
sense, a user may be lured and open a malicious notification believing
that one of her/his installed mobile apps has fired it by seeing the graphic
and the text involved. However, as already mentioned, a more attentive
examination by the user could reveal that the notification was fired by
the browser and not by the actual installed app. Nonetheless, since a
web notification containing information about an installed app is not very
common, users may more easily be deceived in such a scenario.
The case of issuing a DoS attach to a device through web push notifi-
cations has been also investigated. However, in our experiments, this kind
of attack was unsuccessful. The graphic is probably firstly “rendered” by
the browser to meet the proper size, thus blocking the attack. Processing
a very high definition graphic by a mobile app would require process-
ing time, which could eventually lead to an Application not Responding
(ANR) situation. The browsers in our tests seem to properly handle these
situations and result in either firing the notification with its graphic scaled,
or providing a “default”, “harmless” icon for the notification to be issued.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Due to size constraints, Android UI lacks the source verification of graphic
components, exposing the users to many risks. In the literature, several
approaches have been proposed to counter such issues. For instance, a
third party framework named “SecureView” was proposed in [27]. Se-
cureView allows the user to choose a security image as well as writing
a text-based security greeting after installing an application in her/his
device. This way, whenever a sensitive view is displayed, the application
can show the security image and greeting on the sensitive view to provide
view authentication to the user. These kinds of countermeasures can also
be found to have drawbacks. One the one hand, using such a framework
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from applications implicitly means trusting a third party company. On
the other, having users supply both different security images and greetings
for a number of their installed applications might not work for obvious
reasons, including user frustration and negative user experience.
In [5] the researchers propose the introduction of a visual identity to
facilitate the user identify which app he is actually interacting. Their
solution tracks the origin of the app that created the displayed dialog
and presents it in the notification bar. Wu et al. monitor the Win-
dowManagerService to determine the presence of a floating window by
re-calculating the Z-order of all windows and hooking all the calls which
are triggered when creating and clicking on a window [25]. This approach
may not counter UI replication attacks, but it defends many overlay at-
tacks. Ying et al. propose a similar visual identity to Bianchi et al. for
identifying the source of a UI element also tweaking Window Manager
[29]. WindowGuard hooks the Activity Manager, the Window Manager
and Package Manager services to monitor overlaying UI elements and ac-
tivity transition in order to detect possible attacks [20].
An automated screenshot mechanism is proposed in both [16, 15] to
find similarities between apps and determine whether a UI attack is being
made by an app.
Other solutions to UI attacks are presented in [11, 17, 26]. For more
on phishing attacks and countermeasures the interested reader may refer
to [14, 3]
From the aforementioned defense mechanisms it is clear that only some
of the proposed mechanisms can provide only partial measures against
our attacks. The main reason is the context awareness of our app and the
renaming of the app. In this regard, the displayed UI is rendered according
to the targeted applications that are already installed in the device, so
screenshot mechanisms are rendered useless. A very important aspect
that needs to be taken into consideration is that the paper’s described
attacks are actually triggered by the user. Consequently, there are no
overlays to be detected by the system and due to the renaming, all the
appropriate visual signatures can be easily circumvented.
Therefore, when the interaction between human and smartphone is
initiated by the user, then it is of utmost importance to ensure that the
user is actually launching the application s/he intended to launch. While
using the applications’ basic shortcuts it seems that s/he is protected,
since an application using another apps graphic as a the app’s launcher
icon requires it being placed in the apps resources, which consequently
would give Google Bouncer the ability to “intercede” when another apps
graphic has been detected in Google Play. Unfortunately, this is not the
case with home-screen app shortcuts. As already discussed, home-screen
app shortcuts can be easily arbitrarily created by other apps, producing
“identical” forged app shortcuts. In this case, the OS must provide some
new rules and/or checks to overpass this problem e.g. test whether a
specific icon matches the resources of another app.
In the cases where the interaction between human and smartphone
is implicitly initiated by applications, the problem seems a little more
complicated. As it is already mentioned, some “ways” that evolve in
user notification, such as activity launches, dialogs and toasts, have clear
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disadvantages and are rejected by developers in most cases. The major
contribution of this work is the investigation of the Android Notifications’
mechanism from its security perspective. Generically, notifications are
not tightly coupled to their issuer, since they refer to a way of “leaving
a notice” for the user through the OSes features, both enhancing user
experience and also preserving the valuable smartphone resources. Con-
sequently, this notice is left to be opened by the user end navigate her/him
to another UI to continue her/his interaction, presumably a native mo-
bile app, or even a web page. It may be considered as “common sense”
that anyone who “picks up” a notice in either her/his mailbox or her/his
mobile navigation drawer, should be able to identify the sender. As a
result, all involved parties in software development should work towards
this direction, safeguarding the users, as their ultimate aim.
Having these in mind, regarding the notifications’ issues, there are
several solutions that could be proposed for the OS vendor. Being able
to prove the notification’s issuer id, would involve an id to be passed
either to the notifications current app name, or the the required graphic
or even to both. As we have proven both the name of the notification
and also the graphics could be easily being forged. The apps’ package
name can be considered as a candidate that identifies each app, which
also cannot exist as duplicate in Google Play. Nevertheless, it has some
drawbacks, since while enhancing users’ security, it negatively affects user
experience. Forcing the icons/graphics of notifications originating only
from local resources is another option, which would nevertheless require
the OS to rollback to a previous solution, with clear negative results in the
market. Other kinds of side-countermeasures could include removing the
potential from apps to being able to determine which apps are installed
in users’ devices, or making a special check for Google Play apps who are
making a change in their app name and consequently removing them for
the automated updated app list.
The presented work has resulted in four responsibly disclosed to Google
security issues that are not public yet at the time of writing. More specifi-
cally, two issues regard the described methods in forging app notifications
in all Android versions from Marshmallow to Oreo, one issue regarding
forging home-screen shortcuts, affecting all Android versions and one is-
sue regarding the illustrated DoS attack, affecting all Android versions.
The authors have followed all the guidelines regarding the disclosure of
the issues, both in terms of following the security procedures and also in
terms of giving the company enough time to be able to prepare patches.
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